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Abstract
People often conceive themselves, and behave, as members of social groups.
Drawing on a vast empirical literature, this paper o⁄ers a de￿nition of social
identi￿cation and an equilibrium concept where social identities are endogenously
determined. We apply this framework to the political economy of redistribution
in democracies, focusing on class and national identities. We present new empir-
ical evidence that supports the main implications of the model, namely: (a) that
identifying with one￿ s nation is more likely among the poor than among the rich;
(b) that controlling for income, national identi￿cation reduces support for redis-
tribution; and (c) that across democracies there is a strong negative relationship
between the prevalence of national identi￿cation and the level of redistribution.
The model points to common national threats and to diversity within the lower
class as factors that may reduce redistribution, and suggests the possibility that
rising inequality may lead to less demand for redistribution.
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comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Bryan Caplan, Eddie Dekel, Avinash Dixit,
Christina Fong, Sheldon Garon, Ori He⁄etz, Moshe Justman, George Loewenstein, John Londregan
and David Wettstein for comments and discussions. All remaining errors are my own.
11 Introduction
Why do blue collar American workers support less redistribution than their German
counterparts? Why are they more proud of being American? More generally, how
can we explain the fact (to be presented below) that in most advanced democracies
national pride is associated with reduced support for redistribution, and that democra-
cies with less national pride actually redistribute more? This paper suggests that well
documented processes of social identi￿cation can, when applied to a standard political
economy model of redistribution, help explain these and related phenomena.
For the past three decades, social identity has been the focus of intense research
throughout the social sciences.1 Social psychology in particular has produced a rich set
of robust empirical results, based on experimental and ￿eld studies. This paper takes
these results seriously. It ￿rst attempts to distill them into a concise formal statement of
what it means to identify with a group, and what factors are important for determining
which groups people are likely to identify with. It then o⁄ers a concept of equilibrium
where the pro￿les of actions and social identities are jointly determined. This general
framework is applied to the political economy of redistribution. As we shall see, this
application can help explain why lower income individuals tend to identify more strongly
with their nation, why they may or may not vote for high redistribution, why national
threats, immigration and ethnic diversity may be relevant to this outcome and why
rising inequality does not in general lead to more demand for redistribution. Finally,
the paper points to strong but previously unexplored empirical relationships between
national identi￿cation and redistributive politics.
The basic theoretical framework we propose is straightforward. A society may have
many social groups ￿￿American￿ , ￿black￿ , ￿academic￿ , ￿middle class￿and so on ￿
but in any given situation individuals ￿identify￿with only one (in a sense to be made
more precise below). Given their social identities, they choose a course of action, which
determines the aggregate outcome. That outcome forms the social environment that
1As Jenkins (1996) puts it, ￿￿ Identity￿has become one of the unifying frameworks of intellectual
debate in the 1990s. Everybody, it seems, has something to say about it: sociologists, anthropologists,
political scientists, psychologists, geographers, historians, philosophers￿ (p.7). For surveys of the
social psychology literature see Brown (2000), Ellemers Spears and Doosje (1999b, 2002) and Hogg
and Abrams (2001). For a sociological perspective see Jenkins (1996). The political science literature
on gender, class, national, ethnic and other social identities is immense. Classic references include
Anderson (1991), Gellner (1983) and Horowitz (1985). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) proposed a way
to integrate some of this research into economics. As we shall see, our approach generalizes the model
they proposed.
2in turn a⁄ects the pattern of social identities. A social Identity Equilibrium (SIE) is
then a steady state where: (i) each individual￿ s behavior is consistent with his social
identity; (ii) social identities are consistent with the social environment; and (iii) the
social environment is determined by the behavior of all individuals.
Social identi￿cation is de￿ned in terms of preferences. These involve two novel com-
ponents. The ￿rst is the status of the various groups that exist in the economy. Group
status is the relative position of a group on valued dimensions of comparisons such
as wealth, occupational status and educational achievement (Tajfel and Turner 1986).
Thus, if we assume that individuals value consumption, then a group characterized by
high levels of consumption will have a higher status than a group characterized by low
levels, other things equal. The second component is the perceived similarity between
an individual and the other members of the group. Given these two variables, an indi-
vidual is said to identify with group j if (1) he cares about the relative status of group
j and (2) he wants to resemble the members of group j:
Next, we provide a description of the process of identi￿cation with a speci￿c group.
Two factors are at work here. First, a cognitive factor: people are more likely to catego-
rize themselves as members of a group the more ￿similar￿they are to the other members
of that group. Second, an a⁄ective factor: people tend to identify more with high status
groups than with low status groups. Note that the factors underlying the process of
identi￿cation ￿status and distance ￿are in fact the same two factors that a⁄ect indi-
vidual behavior under identi￿cation. This observation helps turn the analysis of social
identity into a tractable one. Finally, to close the model we need a function that maps
the pro￿le of actions taken by individuals into a set of consequences ￿which in turn
determine cognitive distances and group status.
We apply this general framework to a standard model of general-interest redistrib-
ution, i.e. the stable redistributive programs that are carried out using income taxes
and the general social welfare system. We concentrate on two types of social identity:
class and nation. The main point of the model is that to the extent that redistribution
a⁄ects the status of the poorer class, then (a) the level of redistribution may determine
whether the poor identify with their class or with their nation; and (b) class identi￿ca-
tion makes income distribution a more important issue to voters. Thus, two types of
equilibria may emerge. In the ￿rst, the members of the lower class identify with their
class, meaning that they think of themselves and of their interests partly in terms of
membership in that class. Since redistribution a⁄ects the status of their class, they vote
for a relatively high level of redistribution. A high level of redistribution in turn works
3to strengthen that class identity by endowing it with a higher status. In the second type
of equilibrium, low levels of redistribution make the social status of the lower class less
attractive. In such a situation, members of the lower class tend to think of themselves
more as members of the nation as a whole than as members of a low-status part of it.
The poor are hence less concerned with income distribution and more concerned with
issues having to do with the status of their nation. They thus vote for a lower level of
redistribution than they would under class identity.
Which of these equilibria is likely to hold? This depends ￿rst on the perceived
similarity between agents and their class and between agents and their nation. The
experimental results underlying our general framework point to several important fac-
tors. For example, an increased sense of commonality with fellow nationals (due to a
perceived common threat, say) or a reduced sense of similarity to the lower class (due to
an in￿ ux of poor foreign immigrants, say) are both likely to reduce class identi￿cation
among the poor. They hence promote a lower level of redistribution. Further, since
pre-tax income distribution a⁄ects the status of the poor class, the model points to
the possibility that an increase in pre-tax inequality will cause the poor to shift from
a class identity to a national identity, and hence vote for less redistribution. Finally,
the model also allows for the possibility of multiple equilibria given the same economic
and institutional fundamentals, suggesting a potentially important e⁄ect of historical
contingencies. In this respect it relates to papers that study the possibility of multiple
redistributive equilibria (e.g. Piketty 1995, Benabou 2000, Benabou and Tirole 2002),
and more generally to the literature on the di⁄erent welfare systems in the United
States and Western Europe (see Alesina and Glaeser 2004 for a comprehensive discus-
sion). The contribution of this model however is that instead of relying on multiple
beliefs or market imperfections, it highlights the e⁄ects of redistribution on the status
of the lower class and hence on the likelihood that members of that class will identify
with it and behave (vote) in terms of their class membership. Our model also connects
to models in which voters care about issues other than their economic payo⁄s (Roemer
1998, Lee and Roemer 2004), but o⁄ers an explanation of the origin of these other
concerns and of how their prevalence may interact with the political outcome.
The model thus generates a set of new empirical predictions, both at the micro
level and at the national level. Using data from the World Values Survey, The ISSP
1995 ￿National Identity surveys and the Luxembourg Income Study, we ￿nd strong
support for these predictions. First, we ￿nd that in practically all democracies, the
poorer individuals are indeed more likely to be nationalistic, as the model predicts
4(since their more immediate social group has a lower status than the status of the high
class). Second, in most advanced democracies national identi￿cation reduces support
for redistribution. This e⁄ect appears to be very large when compared to the e⁄ect of
material self interest. Third, the model implies that regardless of whether di⁄erences
in redistributive systems arise from exogenous factors or from multiple equilibria, we
should observe a negative relationship between the prevalence of national identi￿cation
and the extent of income redistribution. In a cross-country analysis we indeed ￿nd a
very strong negative relationship between these two variables. Indeed, when looking at
established western democracies, the R2 is between 61% and 72%.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes a de￿nition of social identity and a
general model. Section 3 provides a brief justi￿cation of the general framework based on
evidence from social psychology and experimental economics (a more complete account
is provided in Shayo 2005). Section 4 applies the model to the issue of redistribution
and Section 5 tests the empirical predictions of the application. Section 6 concludes.
2 Social Identity Equilibrium: a General Model
This section presents a framework intended to concisely capture the more robust regu-
larities from social identity research and apply to them the economic notion of equilib-
rium. We concentrate ￿rst on de￿ning and explaining the concepts, and take up their
justi￿cation in the next section.
The primitives of our model are:
￿ a set of agents N;
￿ a set of social groups or categories G = fjjj ￿ N is a social groupg;
￿ a set of available actions Ai for each agent i 2 N;
￿ a set of consequences C and a function h : A ! C ; where A = ￿i2NAi is the set
of possible action pro￿les;
￿ a material payo⁄ function ￿i : C ! R for each agent i 2 N;
￿ a cognitive distance function dij : C ! R for every agent i 2 N and group j 2 G;
￿ a relative status function Rj : C ! R for every group j 2 G:
5Explanations:
Social group: We think of social groups as categories that individuals learn to
recognize when growing up and living in a society, much as they learn other categories
such as ￿vegetable￿ or ￿chair￿ . We do not attempt here to model the cultural or
sociological process by which these social categories evolve. Rather, our focus is on
the process of categorization and identi￿cation with given social groups. This follows
research in cognitive psychology that studies perceptual categorization by focusing on
how stimuli are being allocated to given categories, without explaining how categories
are initially formed.2 We place no formal restrictions on the contents of these groups
(for example that they partition N). Nonetheless, G is not an arbitrary collection of
subsets ￿its elements must be socially signi￿cant categories.
Consequence: In some applications this may simply be the vector of actions chosen
by the agents. In others, however, h may denote a more complex aggregation process,
e.g. a political process.
Cognitive distance: The key to categorization decisions in the cognitive psychol-
ogy literature is the perceived di⁄erences between the stimulus that is to be categorized
on the one hand, and the features of the available categories on the other. The larger
the ￿distance in psychological space￿(Nosofsky 1986, 1992) between stimulus i and cat-
egory j, the lower is the probability that the stimulus would be categorized as a member
of j: Adopting this approach to the process of categorizing oneself into a group,3 we let
dij : C ! R be the perceived distance between individual i 2 N and social group j 2 G:
We allow dij to depend not only on the exogenous characteristics of agent i and group
j; but also on the actions taken by the agents in the economy. For example, if groups
are characterized primarily by their consumption patterns, changing my consumption
bundle may move me farther away from one group and closer to another.
Relative status: Studies of social identity usually argue that the evaluation of
groups cannot be based on some absolute standard. Rather, it is determined through
social comparisons to other groups along valued dimensions of comparisons. We let
Rj : C ! R be the relative status of group j 2 G: For example, in a two-groups
setting a natural speci￿cation would be Rj(c) = ￿j(c) ￿ ￿j0(c) where j;j0 2 G and
￿j(c) ￿ Ei2j￿i(c): Again, the relative status of a group can thus depend on actions
taken by agents in the economy. Note that we assume the same relative status function
2See e.g. Lamberts (1997) and Logan (2004) for recent surveys. For an economic attempt to explain
the emergence of social categories as a result of individual optimization see Fryer and Jackson 2003.
3This follows Turner et al. (1987).
6of a given group for all agents in the economy.4
We are now able to o⁄er our de￿nition of social identity and our solution concept
of the model. We limit the discussion to the case where individuals only identify with
a single group, although the de￿nition can be extended to allow for identi￿cation with
several groups.
De￿nition 1 Agent i 2 N is said to identify with social group j 2 G if his
preferences over consequences can be ordered by a utility function Ui : C ! R of the
form:
Ui(c) = u(￿i(c);Rj(c);dij(c))
such that u is increasing in Rj(c) and decreasing in dij(c).
In words, identi￿cation with a group is taken to mean caring about the relative
status of that group while paying a cognitive cost that increases with the distance
between the individual and the group. Loosely speaking identi￿cation thus implies
making the ￿group￿ s interest￿part of one￿ s own interest. Further, the cognitive cost
of identi￿cation implies that as long as agents identify with a given group, they would
want to resemble that group: from wearing its typical clothes and symbols, to imitating
typical group behavior.
It should be stressed that we use the concept of utility in its conventional meaning,
as a representation of preferences. There exists some evidence to suggest that utility
here may also be understood in its classical, Benthamite meaning as expressing the indi-
vidual￿ s well-being. For example, that a person who identi￿es with a group experiences
an increase in well-being (speci￿cally, in self-esteem) when his group￿ s status increases.5
De￿nition 1 however refers only to preferences over outcomes. Using revealed preference
we can then infer social identities from observed choices made by individuals.6
4The possibility of di⁄erent agents perceiving a di⁄erent relative status of the same group may be
modeled by adding uncertainty about Rj: One may also consider agents biasing their beliefs about
the status of their group. See e.g. Jackson et al. (1996), Mummenday et al. (2001), Ouwerkerk and
Ellemers (2002) and Schmader and Major (1999). However, as a benchmark it seems safe to assume a
general agreement in society about the relative standing of the various groups (Weiss and Fershtman
1998).
5On the Benthamite approach in economics see Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Kahneman et al.
(1997). On the evidence for well-being e⁄ects of identi￿cation see Shayo (2005).
6In section 5 we shall discuss and demonstrate how identi￿cation can be measured in large samples,
when data on actual choices is unavailable.
7Having de￿ned social identi￿cation in terms of preferences, we now propose a solu-
tion concept that captures the endogenous determination of these preferences.
De￿nition 2 A Social Identity Equilibrium (SIE) is a pro￿le of actions a =
(ai)i2N 2 A and a pro￿le of social identities g = (gi)i2N 2 GN such that for all i 2 N
we have
(i) Ui(h(ai;a￿i)) ￿ Ui(h(a0
i;a￿i)) 8a0
i 2 Ai
(ii) Ui(c) = u(￿i(c);Rgi(c);digi(c)) such that u(￿i(c);Rgi(c);digi(c)) ￿ u(￿i(c);Rj(c);dij(c))
8j 2 G
(iii) c = h(a):
The ￿rst condition has to do with choice of actions under a given pattern of social
identities. It is the standard Nash condition (albeit with non standard payo⁄s). The
second condition describes the process determining the pattern of social identities and
hence of preferences. Formally, it requires that each agent￿ s social identity be ￿optimal￿
given the social environment implied by c 2 C: That is, an agent is more likely to
identify with a group the higher is its social status and the smaller is the perceived
distance between himself and that group. The third condition requires that the social
environment be determined by the actions of the agents in the economy.
Note that the de￿nition of SIE does not impose any coordination requirement ￿in
principle, one may identify with a group regardless of whether other members of that
group identify with it. Indeed, by itself the social identity of agent i has no e⁄ect on
other agents￿payo⁄s ￿neither on their material payo⁄ nor on the relative status of
whatever group they identify with. It is only when social identity a⁄ects the choice of
actions that such e⁄ects can come about.
We emphasize that these are equilibrium requirements. We are not asserting that
there exists some controlled, deliberative process in which individuals ￿choose￿their
social identities optimally. Rather, we are using the tools of optimization to describe a
steady state that takes into account the observed process whereby (a) given cognitive
distance, individuals tend to identify with that group that possesses the higher status,
and (b) given status, identify with the group more similar to themselves. Thus for
example, the de￿nition does not preclude equilibria in which agent i could increase Ui(￿)
by simultaneously changing both action and identity. SIE only requires that actions
be optimal given current identities and identities be optimal given current actions ￿
not that agents choose actions taking into account all the alternative identities they
8can potentially have (although such a re￿nement might possibly make sense in some
contexts).7
The SIE model o⁄ers a generalization of several existing models. First, in situations
where one￿ s actions cannot a⁄ect one￿ s group￿ s relative status nor one￿ s distance from
that group, an agent behaves like a standard material payo⁄ maximizer. Second, the
SIE generalizes the model of social identity proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
Akerlof and Kranton focus primarily on the e⁄ects of social prescriptions that indicate
the appropriate behavior for people in given social categories. ￿Identi￿cation￿in their
terminology means the adoption of such rules of behavior. Now, insofar as prototypical
modes of behavior a⁄ect perceived distances between self and group, our model may
also result in people behaving in accordance with their group￿ s prototypical behav-
ior. Similarly, our model can generate utility losses from non-prototypical behavior by
other members of the group (since that may decrease perceived similarity to the group).
However, social identity produces conformist behavior only under conditions that make
identi￿cation with the group hold in equilibrium (e.g. its status is su¢ ciently high com-
pared to other cognitively feasible identities). Third, our approach generalizes models
that assume altruistic preferences (see Fehr and Schmidt 2001 for a review). If the pay-
o⁄s of ￿ingroup￿members are positively related to ingroup status and if actions only
a⁄ect the ingroup members, then we may observe altruistic behavior. However, such
￿universal altruism￿disappears once actions a⁄ect members of an outgroup that com-
petes with the ingroup for status. In that case we may observe ￿particular altruism￿ ,
bene￿tting ingroup members only, and possibly hurting outgroup members.8 Finally,
we may even observe costly actions that decrease the welfare of ingroup members if
such actions promote the ingroup￿ s relative status (Congleton and Fudulu 1996).
This concludes the general statement of the model. Throughout this paper we shall
assume that the utility function takes the following additively separable form:
7On people￿ s tendency to underestimate changes in their preferences see Loewenstein and Angner
(2002) and Loewenstein et al. (2003). As Loewenstein and Angner put it, "it may be di¢ cult to
predict changes in preferences because our current preferences are an integral aspect of our personal
identity... People de￿ne who they are in part by their tastes and values. Thus, having di⁄erent tastes
and values may seem like a betrayal of what one currently holds near and dear".
8An ￿Ingroup￿of agent i is a social group to which i belongs. Similarly, an ￿outgroup￿is a social
group to which i does not belong. See Brewer and Brown 1998, p. 558-559. The terms ￿universal
altruism￿and ￿particular altruism￿are borrowed from Hegel (see Avineri 1972). They refer to altruism
directed at all agents in the economy versus altruism directed only at agents who belong to a particualr
group.
9Ui(c) = ￿i(c) + ￿Rj(c) ￿ ￿dij(c) (1)
where ￿;￿ > 0.
3 Evidence
Before applying the SIE framework to political economy, this section provides a brief
empirical justi￿cation for its use. Shayo (2005) provides a more detailed account and
shows how this model accounts for several behavioral regularities that are not explained
by standard economic models, nor by alternative social preferences such as altruism,
inequity aversion or warm-glow.
3.1 Minimal Group experiments
Consider the following experiment. A set of agents N is partitioned into two equal
groups, say G1 and G2. Each agent knows to which group he belongs. Each agent then
chooses an allocation of pro￿ts (e.g. money) between two other randomly chosen agents,
one from each group. The choices are made privately and simultaneously. There is no
interaction between agents and they never know the decisions made by other agents
nor do they know who is in their group or who is in the other group. After all agents
made their choices, payments are made in private and the experiment is over.
Allocations are chosen from linear choice sets. Agent i 2 N chooses an action
ai 2 [al;ah] ￿ R subject to the following budget constraint:
bi = ￿1ai + ￿2 (2)
where ai is the amount that agent i allocates to an anonymous member his group and
bi is the amount that he allocates to an anonymous member of the other group. Figure
1 illustrates. A negative ￿1 means a trade-o⁄ between the ingroup member￿ s pro￿t
and that of the outgroup member. Note that when ￿1 < ￿1 (panel a) increasing the
ingroup￿ s pro￿t reduces total pro￿ts. A positive ￿1 means both pro￿ts move together.
When ￿1 > 1 (panel b), increasing the ingroup (and outgroup) pro￿ts reduces the
di⁄erence between the ingroup and the outgroup. Note that agent i0s material payo⁄ ￿
the total amount allocated to him by other agents ￿is independent of his decision.
Recall that the status of a group is its relative position on a valued dimension of
10comparison. In the present setting the only such dimension is the pro￿ts of group
members. De￿ne the relative status of group j as the di⁄erence between the mean
pro￿ts of the two groups:
Rj = ￿j ￿ ￿j0 j;j
0 2 fG1;G2g (3)
where ￿j is the mean pro￿t of the members of group j: Finally, since agents know
nothing about the actions or the pro￿ts of other agents, the perceived distance dij
between any agent i 2 N and any group j 2 fG1;G2g is independent of i￿ s allocation
decision ai:
By de￿nition 1, an agent i that identi￿es with group j prefers an outcome where
Rj is high over one where it is low, other things (￿i; dij) equal. Since actions in this
setting a⁄ect relative status but not material payo⁄ nor perceived distance, identifying
with group j requires choosing an action ai in a way that maximizes Rj. In particular,
identifying with the group that one belongs to requires choosing the maximal allocation
to the ingroup when ￿1 < 1 (panel a) and the minimal allocation when ￿1 > 1 (panel
b).9;10 We can then examine whether exogenously manipulating the factors that by
condition (ii) in the de￿nition of SIE increase the likelihood of identi￿cation, generates
the expected change in behavior.
3.1.1 Perceived distance
Environments like the one we just described have been studied extensively in exper-
iments known as the ￿Minimal Group Paradigm￿(MGP) initiated in the late 1960s
(especially Tajfel 1970, Tajfel et al. 1971) and replicated hundreds of times (see Brewer
1979 and Bourhis and Gagnon 2001 for reviews). The robust result is that agents that
were categorized to groups based on some questionnaire or task11, systematically favor
their ingroup member. Thus, in the Tajfel et al. (1971) experiments, the proportion
9Equations (2) and (3) imply:
Rj = ￿j ￿ ￿j0
=
1
N=2
[
X
i2j
ai +
X
i2j0
(￿1ai + ￿2) ￿ (
X
i2j
(￿1ai + ￿2) +
X
i2j0
ai)]
thus for an agent i 2 j; @Rj=@ai = 2(1 ￿ ￿1)=N:
10Note that this is only a necessary condition for identi￿cation ￿the benchmark experiment we just
described does not yet allow us to infer identi￿cation based also on choices that a⁄ect distances.
11e.g. ￿aesthetic preference￿or ￿over-estimators￿and ￿under-estimators￿of number of dots on a
screen. In fact group membership is randomly assigned.
11of respondents who chose allocations that favor members of their group ranged from
68% to 94%. Further, in allocation decisions involving ￿1 > 1; a majority of subjects
choose distributions that maximize the relative gain in favor of the ingroup member
over distributions that maximize the absolute pro￿t of the ingroup member, as well as
the joint pro￿t (Brewer 1979, Tajfel and Turner 1979).
We take such categorizations into groups to be a form of exogenously a⁄ecting
perceived distance from group. Most commonly, they consist of highlighting a common
trait of the ingroup while contrasting it with the corresponding trait of an outgroup. The
interpretation ￿perceived distance￿is supported by the participants￿reports: people
who are categorized indicate that they are more similar to their anonymous ingroup
members than to the outgroup members.
3.1.2 Group status
Consider now adding a second valued dimension along which groups are compared, such
that the two groups are not initially equal in status. A substantial body of research,
both experimental and correlational, exists on the implications. The studies consis-
tently show that people tend to identify more with high status groups than with low
status groups.12 As measures of identi￿cation, many experimental studies use alloca-
tion decisions similar to equation (2), as well as subjects￿reported feelings and attitudes
toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Field studies usually have to rely on the second
type of measure. A meta analysis of 92 experimental studies with high-status/low-
status manipulation con￿rms that high status group members favor their ingroup over
the outgroup signi￿cantly more than do low status group members (Bettencourt et al.
2001). Similar results emerge from ￿eld studies. For example winning sports teams
tend to attract more fans (Boen et al. 2002) and generate more identi￿cation (Cialdini
et al. 1976). Double-major university students identify more with their higher status
departments, and are more likely to identify with a given department the lower is the
status of the other department they major in (Roccas 2003).
12See e.g. Ellemers et al. (1988), Ellemers et al. (1992), Ellemers (1993), Ellemers et al. (1999a),
Guimond et al. (2002), Hogg and Hains (1996), Mael and Ashforth (1992) and Roccas (2003). The
results of Glaeser et al. (2000) that in a trust game high status senders received more money back
from recipients than did low status senders can also be interpreted in this light. Thus, if I identify
with you, I will send you back more money, not because I am ￿trustworthy￿but because I care about
our ￿group.￿It is interesting to note that Glaeser et al. also ￿nd that the amount sent back increases
when recipient and sender are from the same ethnic background: ￿Eleven out of the twelve times in
which the recipient sent back nothing, the sender and the recipient were of di⁄erent races￿ . This ￿ts
well with the other factor a⁄ecting identi￿cation: similarity.
123.2 Conformity studies
By de￿nition 1, an agent i that identi￿es with group j prefers an outcome where dij is
low over one where it is high, other things equal. In other words, i seeks to be similar to
other members of j.13 We would thus conclude from SIE condition (ii) that categorizing
people to a group and highlighting their similarity to it would increase conformity with
other members of that group. Results from the literature on social in￿ uence con￿rm
this expectation. People are more likely to conform to views and behaviors of members
of their group than to those of outgroup members. Further, people conform more to
ingroup norms of behavior when group concerns are highlighted, when comparisons
between ingroup and outgroup are made possible and when group identity is made
more salient than individual identity.14
3.3 Decisions that a⁄ect both status and distance
Consider now the MGP setting of section 3.1, but allow agents to know the typical
behavior of members of their group.15 This e⁄ectively allows dij to respond to i￿ s
actions. We would hence expect categorization to a group to generate ingroup bias ￿
but that this bias would be mitigated when ingroup members are known to typically
make non-discriminating allocation decisions. This expectation is in fact con￿rmed in
a study by Jetten et al. (1996).
3.4 Explaining behavior in public goods environments
Consider a voluntary contribution linear public goods environment (see Ledyard 1995).
Agents are divided into groups of size n. Each agent i is endowed with an income of
!i, part of which can be contributed to a public account where bene￿ts accrue to all
group members. Contribution decisions are made in private, but all agents know the
total amount contributed by their ingroup members. Individual i￿ s material payo⁄ is
13Of course conformist behavior can result from standard material considerations (e.g. Banerjee
1992). The point here is that ￿xing material aspects, agents will be in￿ uenced more by the behavior
of people in the group they identify with, than by the behavior of other people.
14See Mackie and Wright (2001), Spears et al. (2001) and Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) for recent
reviews on social in￿ uence as it relates to social identity.
15Typical behavior refers to past behavior by people who were categorized as members of that group
(e.g. ￿detailed perceivers￿ ) - but not behavior by anybody participating in the current experiment.
13given by:
￿i = (!i ￿ ai) +
￿
n
X
i2j
ai , 8i 2 j (4)
where ai 2 [0;!i] is i￿ s contribution and 1 < ￿ < n, so that material payo⁄ maximizers
have a dominant strategy to contribute nothing to the public account but the e¢ cient
outcome is that all contribute. To illustrate the e⁄ect of identifying with the group one
was assigned to, let relative status be given by equation (3) and let dij = ￿ij + ￿(ai ￿
aj￿i)2 be the perceived distance, where ￿ij is some exogenous distance parameter, ￿ ￿ 0
and aj￿i is mean contribution by other members of group j (excluding i). This allows
actions to a⁄ect distance. Maximizing (1) under these conditions yields the following
interior solution:16
ai =
1
2￿￿
[(1 + ￿)
￿
n
￿
￿
n
￿ 1] + aj￿i: (5)
This simple result can help explain several observed regularities from PG experiments.
First, the level of contribution ai increases with the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
￿=n; since i loses less material payo⁄ by contributing while the group gains more out
of the contribution. Second, for given MPCR, contributions are higher the larger is the
group, since increasing group size while keeping MPCR ￿xed increases the return to
ingroup status. Finally, optimal contributions increase with the contributions of other
ingroup members ￿even in a one shot game. See Fischbacher et al. 2001, Holt and
Laury (forthcoming), Ledyard (1995) and Zelmer (2003) for evidence.
The solution in equation (5) is conditional on identi￿cation with the group. Other-
wise, the agent contributes zero. We would thus expect contributions to increase with
the factors that a⁄ect identi￿cation. Consistent with our framework, a large number of
experimental results show that keeping material payo⁄s ￿xed, people tend to cooperate
more with members of their group when their similarity to the group is made more
salient, and when their group￿ s performance is contrasted with the performance of an
outgroup.17 Cooperation has also been found to decrease with ingroup heterogeneity,
which we will interpret as tending to increase perceived distance from group.18 Finally,
16If distance is exogenous (￿ = 0) the agent will be at a corner solution. Similarly, if !i = ! 8i;
then in equilibria where all agents identify with their ingroup, all agents will be at a corner solution,
contributing zero if (1 + ￿)￿
n ￿
￿
n < 1 and contributing ! if (1 + ￿)￿
n ￿
￿
n > 1 (for other parameter
values any symmetric contribution level is an equilibrium). In either case, the MPCR and n work to
increase contributions.
17See e.g. Brewer and Kramer (1986), De Cremer and Van Vugt (1998, 1999), Kramer and Brewer
(1984, 1986), Orbell et al. (1988), Sausgruber (2003), Solow and Kirkwood (2000) and Van Vugt and
Hart (2004).
18See Ledyard (1995), Polzer et al. (1999) and Zelmer (2003) for experimental results. For ￿eld
14if the payo⁄ structure in equation (4) were augmented to include a negative e⁄ect of
contributions tothe ingroup on the the payo⁄s of outgroup members ￿i.e. keep @￿i=@ai
and @￿j=@ai unchanged and let @￿j0=@ai < 0 for i 2 j 6= j0 ￿then the optimal con-
tribution would increase according to our model, since agents care about their group￿ s
relative position. This prediction is also con￿rmed in the data.19
Overall, results from social psychology and experimental economics lend strong sup-
port to the notion of social identity set forth in de￿nitions 1 and 2. When led to perceive
themselves as closer to their group, agents reveal themselves as caring about how well
their group is doing in comparison to another group, and appear to be willing to sacri￿ce
personal material gain to promote that goal.
4 Nation, Class and Redistribution
It is often said that people don￿ t just vote their economic interest ￿they vote their
identity.20 The frameork we develped in the previous sections allows us to make such
claims more precise, and to draw testable predictions on the relationship between social
identity and redistributive politics.
Consider a simple general-interest redistribution setting involving linear-taxation
and pure majority voting. The economy has a continuum of agents with a cumulative
income distribution given by F(yi) where yi is the pre-tax income of agent i. We denote
mean income by y and assume F(y) > 0:5 (the mean is greater than the median). Agent
i￿ s material payo⁄ ￿i is just his after-tax income (or consumption), which is composed
of income net of taxes and a government transfer k :
￿i = (1 ￿ t)yi + k (6)
where t 2 [0;1] is the tax rate. As in the standard model of redistribution ￿nanced by
distortionary taxation (Romer 1975) income taxation involves deadweight losses, which
we assume to be quadratic (following Bolton and Roland 1997).21 The government￿ s
studies, see Alesina et al. (1999) on the relationship between ethnic homogeneity and provision of
public goods across U.S. localities, and Costa and Kahn (2003) on the relationship between company
heterogeneity and cowardice in the Union Army.
19Bornstein and Ben Yossef (1994) is a particularly clean example. See Bornstein (2002) for a review
of the literature.
20In the same vein Blinder and Krueger (2004) report that expressed views on economic policies are
much more strongly related to ￿ideology￿than to measures of self-interest.
21The assumption of a deadweight-loss function that is symmetric around zero is harmless in this
15budget constraint is then:
k = (t ￿ t
2=2)y (7)
We keep the political process as simple as possible, so that the equilibrium policy
directly re￿ ects the policy preferences of the voters. This is a reasonable approach to
general-interest redistribution. An agent￿ s action is simply a vote for her preferred tax
rate given the government budget constraint. The actual tax rate t￿ is determined by a
pure majority rule.22 It can be easily veri￿ed that absent social identity considerations
the chosen tax rate is
y￿ym
y where ym is the median income. This is the standard median
voter result, whereby the equilibrium level of redistribution is higher the greater is the
distance between median and mean income (Meltzer and Richard 1981).
4.1 A Two-Class Model
There is little doubt that social-class has been a potentially signi￿cant source of identity
a⁄ecting voting behavior in modern industrialized countries. A second important social
category in western democracies at least since the early 20th century has been the
nation.23 We now analyze the conditions under which voters are likely to identify with
their class or with their nation, and the implications for redistributive policy.
We present a simple two-class model that conveys the basic intuition.24 There are
three social groups or categories in the economy. The ￿rst two ￿the ￿poor￿and the
￿wealthy￿￿are characterized by the income levels of their members. We term these
social groups ￿classes￿ . In addition there exists a ￿superordinate￿social category ￿the
￿Nation￿￿that includes all the agents in the economy. The set of social groups is then
given by:
setting since we only consider nonnegative tax rates. Allowing for negative taxes would require a more
realistic speci￿cation. This would complicate the model without changing the equilibrium tax rate,
and hence we keep the quadratic speci￿cation for simplicity. However, if one were primarily interested
in the political preferences of the rich, other assumptions may be appropriate.
22That is, agents vote directly and sincerely over tax rates and the tax rate adopted is the Condorcet
winner if it exists.
23See Evans (2000) for a survey of the evidence on class voting. The literature on the prominence
of the nation as a social category is immense. See e.g. Anderson (1991), Billig (1995), and Gellner
(1983). While we shall discuss how ethnic diversity may a⁄ect our results, we do not model ethnic
identity directly in this paper.
24Similar qualitative results emerge when we allow for a continuum of social classes. The cuto⁄point
between those who identify with their nation and those who identify with their class is endogenous in
this case ￿but it is still the poorer individuals who identify with the nation.
16G = fP;W;Ng (8)
where the ￿rst two social groups, P and W, are de￿ned by their income levels:
P = fi￿N : yi ￿ yg (9)
W = fi￿N : yi > yg (10)
Note from (6) and (7) that as long as t < 1, ￿i will be linear and increasing in yi and
hence P and W may also be written in terms of consumption, e.g. P = fi : ￿i ￿ ￿g
where ￿ is mean consumption. The important implication of these de￿nitions given
our assumptions on F; is that the agent with median income is not in the wealthy class
(but the results are unchanged if the cuto⁄ point between the wealthy and the rest is
higher than the mean).
We keep the status of the nation exogenously ￿xed at RN = ￿: The qualitative
results of the model are unchanged when RN depends positively on ￿.25 Essentially
however, this is a one country model that has little to say about how the relative status
of the nation is determined.26
The relative status of the two classes is just a weighted average of the di⁄erence in
their mean after-tax income and the di⁄erence in their mean pre-tax income:
RP = ￿(￿P ￿ ￿W) + (1 ￿ ￿)(yP ￿ yW) = ￿RW (11)
where ￿j ￿ E(￿iji 2 j), yj ￿ E(yiji 2 j) for j = P;W and ￿ 2 [0;1] is the
weight of the group￿ s after-tax income in the determination of its status. If ￿ = 1 class
status depends entirely on mean group material payo⁄. This case corresponds to the
concept of status used in section 3. However, in a redistribution context, it is sometimes
argued that there exists a negative ￿stigma￿associated with welfare recipiency (Mo¢ tt
1983). This might suggest that social status is related to pre-tax income and not just
25Indeed the main results are strengthened in this case. Nationalists prefer less redistribution not
just because of how redistribution a⁄ects class status, but also because high taxes harm the overall
wealth of the nation (due to deadweight losses). Our results, however, do not rely on a negative e⁄ect
of taxation on national status.
26As argued by Smith and Jarkko (1998), general national pride is not closely tied to objective
conditions but rather is related to ￿idio-national readings of history, assessments of the contemporary
geo-political situation, and national aspirations￿ .
17to consumption, which can be captured by allowing ￿ < 1:
By (6) we have ￿j = (1 ￿ t)yj + k, which gives us the status of the groups as a
function of the tax rate:
RP = ￿RW = ￿(￿t ￿ 1), where ￿ ￿ yW ￿ yP > 0: (12)
Thus the relative status of the poor group depends negatively on the pre-tax income
inequality as measured by the di⁄erence in mean group income, and positively on the
level of redistribution as measured by the tax rate. The e⁄ect of redistribution on
relative status increases with pre-tax inequality and with the weight of consumption in
the determination of group status.
To focus on the status implications of redistribution, we assume ￿xed cognitive
distances for all individuals in a given group, and that it is cognitively ￿very￿hard to
identify with a group that one does not belong to.27 Speci￿cally, we assume:
dij =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
dP for i 2 j = P
dW for i 2 j = W
dN for i 2 j = N
dH if i = 2 j
(A1)
Where
dH > dP + 2￿￿=￿ (A2)
dH > dW ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿=￿ (A3)
(A2) ensures that the poor do not identify with the rich class. It requires the
perceived distance between a poor person and the upper class to be large enough relative
to income inequality, and the cognitive cost of categorization to be su¢ ciently important
relative to group status. (A3) ensures that the rich do not identify with the poor class.
It is weaker than A2 and in particular holds whenever the distance from the other class
is larger than distance from own class:
27Arguably, redistribution might a⁄ect the cognitive distances between individuals - indeed a higher
tax rate would reduce consumption di⁄erences between any two individuals in the economy. But it is
not clear if it should reduce, say, a poor person￿ s distance from the poor group more or less than it
reduces his distance from the nation, and results will be sensitive to the functional form of the distance
function.
184.2 Social Identity Equilibria
Under the utility function in (1), and (A1)-(A3), SIE condition (ii) implies that in any
SIE, the pro￿le of social identities g = (gi)i2N satis￿es:
gi =
(
N if ￿(RN ￿ RP) ￿ ￿(dN ￿ dP)
P otherwise
8i 2 P (13)
gi =
(
N if ￿(RN ￿ RW) ￿ ￿(dN ￿ dW)
W otherwise
8i 2 W
where we assume national identity is chosen in case of a tie. This condition is simply
saying that agents will balance the relative distance from the various groups against
the relative status of these groups. Note that by (12) the status of the wealthy class is
never lower than the status of the poor class (and is strictly higher unless both t = 1
and ￿ = 1). Thus, for similar cognitive distance from class, condition (13) implies that
the poor are more likely to hold a national identity than the rich. The alternative social
identity of the poor simply has a lower status.28
We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium tax rate t￿. SIE Condition (i)
says that actions must be optimal given social identities.29 We thus look at the policy
preferences induced by the various possible social identities. An individual identifying
with the nation would ideally prefer the tax rate that solves :
Max
t2[0;1]
(1 ￿ t)yi + (t ￿ t
2=2)y + ￿￿ ￿ ￿dN (14)
28This result hinges on two important assumptions. That the social status of the rich class is primar-
ily a function of its economic achievements and that dN is similar for all classes. These assumptions are
reasonable for today￿ s industrialized nation states. But consider 18th and 19th century Europe, where
productivity resides with the bourgeoisie but status still resides predominantly with the aristocracy.
Further, at these early stages of industrialization and urbanization much of the poor population lives
in rural areas, often separated from the rest of "their nation" by linguistic and transportation barriers.
Distance from the nation (dN) is thus higher for the rural poor than for the urban middle class. Under
these conditions, the urban middle class is expected to be more nationalistic than the rural poor.
Similar conditions appear to hold in colonized countries, where the local elites do not enjoy as high
a status as they would based solely on their domestic economic position; and in developing countries
where much of the poor population is concentrated in rural areas.
29In the current context this condition means that when forming policy preferences, agents take their
social identities as given. That is, they do not take into account the possibility that as taxes change,
they may stop caring about the group they currently identify with and start caring about some other
group and consequently may come to have policy preferences di⁄erent from the ones they currently
hold. On voters￿tendency to overestimate the stability of their political positions see Lowenthal and
Loewenstein (2001).
19which yields an ideal point :
t
￿
N(yi) = Maxf
y ￿ yi
y
;0g: (15)
Since we do not assume that national status responds systematically to the tax level,
identifying with the nation yields the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) result. In
other words, our results do not depend on nationalists willing to sacri￿ce material payo⁄
because they recognize a negative e⁄ect of redistributive taxation on national strength.
An individual identifying with the poor class will solve
Max
t2[0;1]
(1 ￿ t)yi + (t ￿ t
2=2)y + ￿￿(￿t ￿ 1) ￿ ￿dP
with an ideal point:
t
￿
P(yi) = Minf
y ￿ yi
y
+
￿￿￿
y
;1g: (16)
And similarly an individual identifying with the wealthy class will have an ideal point:
t
￿
W(yi) = Maxf
y ￿ yi
y
￿
￿￿￿
y
;0g: (17)
In words, while class identi￿cation induces individuals to care more about the distri-
bution of income, national identi￿cation shifts their social identity concerns elsewhere
to the status of their nation, e.g. to its power and grandeur in the world or other such
variables that are not clearly related to tax policies.
Note that for any given social identity, preferences are single-peaked. Further, by
(13) we know that in equilibrium all members of a given class have the same identity.
Take t￿
N(yi) ￿the ideal tax rate for an agent with income yi under national identity ￿as
our benchmark. It is decreasing in yi: Now if the poor identify with their class, the ideal
tax rates of the entire group shifts further up, as t￿
P(yi) > t￿
N(yi). If the rich identify
with their class their ideal tax rate stays at zero (since yi > y 8i 2 W). Thus, for any
pattern of social identi￿cation that may pertain in equilibrium we have single peaked
preferences over t with ideal points strictly decreasing in yi for yi 2 [0;y] and constant
for yi ￿ y: We can therefore apply the median voter theorem and get the equilibrium
tax rate:
t
￿ =
(
t￿
N(ym) if gm = N
t￿
P(ym) if gm = P
(18)
20Where agent m is the median income agent de￿ned by F(ym) = 0:5:
Recalling that ym < y and using (13), (15) and (16) we can now write t￿ as a function
of the di⁄erence in the relative status of the groups RN ￿ RP:
t
￿ =
(
y￿ym
y if RN ￿ RP ￿
￿
￿(dN ￿ dP)
Minf
y￿ym
y +
￿￿￿
y ;1g if RN ￿ RP <
￿
￿(dN ￿ dP)
(19)
And from (12) in equilibrium we also have:
RN ￿ RP = ￿ ￿ ￿(￿t
￿ ￿ 1) (20)
Equations (19) and (20) thus provide the equilibrium conditions. They are plotted
in Figure 2 for intermediate values of
￿
￿(dN ￿ dP).
It is clear from the ￿gure that depending on the parameters of the model we may
get a unique equilibrium or multiple ones. If (dN ￿ dP) is su¢ ciently low, then there
exists a unique equilibrium where the median identi￿es with the nation and the amount
of redistribution is relatively low at t￿ = t￿
N(ym): Conversely, if (dN ￿dP) is su¢ ciently
high, there may exist a unique equilibrium where the median identi￿es with his class
and the tax rate is high at t￿ = t￿
P(ym). However, as long as ￿￿ > 0 (the income
distribution is not degenerate and consumption matters for the relative status of the
class), there exist values of (dN ￿ dP) at an intermediate level such that there exist
two ￿stable￿equilibria. At the low tax rate equilibrium, the relative status of the poor
is su¢ ciently low to induce the median voter to identify with the nation rather than
with the poor even if that entails a higher cognitive cost. He then prefers a low tax
rate. However, with a high tax rate the poor are not that far behind the rich in their
standards of living and hence in their status. The median may now identify with the
poor class and thus vote for a higher tax rate. The conditions for unique and multiple
equilibria are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the two-class model:
(i) if
￿
￿(dN￿dP) ￿ ￿+￿￿￿￿Minf
y￿ym+￿￿￿
y ;1g then t￿
N(ym) is the unique equilibrium
tax rate and gm = N;
(ii) if
￿
￿(dN ￿dP) > ￿+￿￿￿￿(
y￿ym
y ) then t￿
P(ym) is the unique equilibrium tax rate
and gm = P;
(iii) if ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿Minf
y￿ym+￿￿￿
y ;1g <
￿
￿(dN ￿ dP) ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿(
y￿ym
y ) then both
t￿
N(ym) and t￿
P(ym) are equilibrium tax rates with gm = N and gm = P, respectively.
21The ￿rst implication of this result has to do with the e⁄ect of the distance that
citizens perceive between themselves and their nation. The lower is dN, the higher is
the likelihood of a low-redistribution equilibrium, other things equal. Perceived distance
may be due to ￿fundamentals￿such as ethnic or cultural diversity, but is susceptible
to various shocks. The experimental results suggest that a common threat, salient
international competition or a con￿ ict with another nation, would all tend to reduce
dN and hence, according to our model, increase the likelihood of a low-redistribution
equilibrium. In particular, a salient national security danger is likely to enhance a
feeling that ￿we are all in the same boat￿￿rich and poor alike. But a national identity
means less weight on class issues and less support for redistribution. This suggests that
there may be an incentive for elites to hype national threats ￿perhaps even to the
point of going to war ￿in order to di⁄use domestic claims for more redistribution, or to
soften opposition for a reduction in the level of redistribution (see the related discussion
on the supply of hatred in Glaeser, 2005). In the longer run, the nature of the school
system ￿whether it fosters similarity to the nation or class distinctions ￿should also
a⁄ect the redistributive regime (see Weber 1979, Kremer and Sarychev 1998, Gradstein
and Justman 2002).
Which brings us to the second implication. Factors that decrease the sense of dis-
tance between the median and the lower class would tend to increase class identi￿cation
and hence support for redistribution. One interesting implication relates to the e⁄ect
of ethnic diversity. As the experimental results suggest, group identi￿cation declines
with heterogeneity. Suppose for example that ethnic diversity is concentrated at the
poorer segments of society, so the nation as a whole is more ethnically homogeneous
than the poor group. This would mean a lower (dN ￿ dP); reducing the likelihood of
class identi￿cation on the part of the lower class and hence of a high-redistribution
equilibrium. One case in point might be the shift of signi￿cant portions of the working
class in Western Europe from socialist to nationalist parties (Kitschelt 1996, Ignazi
2003, Lubbers et al. 2002). A recent survey on the resurgence of the radical right in
Western Europe states that ￿certainly the most common explanatory factor put forward
for the electoral breakthrough of the radical right are immigration and the presence of
immigrants￿(Schain et al. 2002, p.11). Such a relationship is readily interpretable in
terms of our model: immigration of foreign workers a⁄ects primarily the composition
of the poorer segments of society. Categorizing oneself as part of the working class is
not as self-evident anymore. Consistent with our model, Soroka et al. (forthcoming)
￿nd a negative relationship across eighteen OECD countries between changes in social
22spending and immigration ￿ ows in the 1970-1998 period.30
Third, a high relative status of the nation (high ￿) would also tend to increase the
likelihood of national identi￿cation and a low-tax equilibrium. Ronald Reagan once
said he hoped history would remember him ￿on the basis that... I wanted to see if the
American people couldn￿ t get back that pride, and that patriotism, that con￿dence,
that they had in our system. And I think they have.￿ 31 If indeed they have, by our
model it helps explain the popularity and political success of his tax policies even among
blue collar workers.
Finally, an interesting question arises as to the e⁄ect of pre-tax inequality. Note that
we have two di⁄erent measures of pre-tax inequality in this model: the median to mean
ratio and the inter-class di⁄erence ￿. Locally, around the equilibrium points, the e⁄ect
of an increase in pre-tax inequality is unambiguously to increase redistribution. Both
t￿
N(ym) and t￿
P(ym) are increasing in
y￿ym
y , and thus increase as this measure of inequality
increases. t￿
P(ym) is also increasing in the inter-class di⁄erence, thus responding even
further to increases in pre-tax inequality. However, it is not clear that an economy with
very high pre-tax inequality will in general be at a high tax equilibrium.32 This is so
because ￿ and
y￿ym
y work in opposite directions in both parts (i) and (ii) of proposition
1. As the median becomes poorer relative to the mean, he chooses a higher tax rate,
whatever his identity (as in the standard Meltzer and Richard result). This in turn
tends to increase the status of the poor and make a high tax equilibrium more likely.
However, as ￿ increases, the status of the poor falls, making class identi￿cation and a
high tax equilibrium less likely, and a nationalistic low-tax equilibrium more likely. Thus
an exogenous increase in income inequality that substantially hurts the status of the
poor may actually promote a shift of the poor towards supporting less redistribution.33
More generally, proposition 1 suggests that we may observe rather di⁄erent levels of
30The idea that support for redistribution increases as identi￿cation with the group that bene￿ts
from it increases, and that such identi￿cation is related to distance along ethnic dimensions, is also
supported by Luttmer (2001). Based on the American GSS, Luttmer reports that support for welfare
spending increases as the share of local welfare recipients from the respondent￿ s race increases. The
model also appears consistent with the evidence presented by Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and
Glaeser (2004), on the relation between racial heterogeneity and the extent of redistribution, but it
points to the importance of heterogeneity within the poor and middle classes ￿and not in society as
a whole.
31Reagan to Barbara Walters, quoted in The New York Times, June 6, 2004.
32This is consistent with most of the empirical studies reviewed in Benabou (1996) and Alesina and
Glaeser (2004). See however Milanovic (2000).
33To see this note that in both parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition the right hand side of the inequality
is increasing in ￿ , and strictly so in part (ii). On the other hand the right hand side of the inequalities
in (i) and (ii) are decreasing in
y￿ym
y :
23redistribution among economies with similar pre-tax income distributions and similar
political institutions, and it points to several factors that can cause such di⁄erences.
However, the proposition also suggests that we may observe di⁄erent levels of redistri-
bution even when all these factors are held constant, as di⁄erent levels of redistribution
serve to reinforce the identi￿cation patterns that gave rise to these levels of redistribu-
tion. That is, even if the lower class Swedes, say, were just as diverse as the lower class
Americans and their nation had the same relative status as the USA, in equilibrium
they could still identify less with their nation simply due to the relatively high status
of their class which results from the (historically given) high degree of redistribution.
As a result, they would indeed support the high level of redistribution. Historical con-
tingencies may thus have a lasting e⁄ect on the redistributive system.34 In any case,
empirically we should expect to ￿nd higher levels of national identi￿cation the lower is
the level of redistribution, and vice versa.
5 Evidence: National Identity and Redistribution
Our application of the SIE framework makes several new predictions concerning na-
tional identity and redistribution in democracies.35 In particular, the application of
SIE conditions (i) and (ii) to this context imply, respectively, the following:
P1. Given social identity, support for redistribution is decreasing in income. Further,
for given income, support for redistribution decreases with national identi￿cation among
the non-wealthy classes (equations (15),(16)).
P2. The poor are more likely to identify with their nation (condition (13)).
While the equilibrium analysis implies:
P3. Across countries, democracies should exhibit a negative correlation between
levels of national identi￿cation and levels of redistribution (proposition 1).
To assess the plausibility of these predictions we use both micro and macro level
data. The micro data come from two sources: the World Values Survey (WVS, In-
glehart et al. 2000) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP): National
34Such contingencies may well be factors included in our model e.g. the heterogeneous-immigrant
composition of the American working class in the early 20th century, or the absence of wars from
Swedish history after the Napoleonic era.
35We will not revisit here the e⁄ects of ethnic fragmentation. The reported evidence cited above
seems to accord with our model, although as we noted a more careful examination seems to be called
for in light of our analysis. The e⁄ect of national threats, and the interaction of domestic policy with
the incidence of war are also beyond the scope of this paper.
24Identity, 1995. Each of these surveys covers more than twenty democracies during the
1990￿ s. The ISSP 1995 provides better measures of national identity. However, it does
not contain data on attitudes towards redistribution. The WVS contains a cruder mea-
sure of national identi￿cation, but includes measures of preferences for redistribution.
Finally, to measure the extent of redistribution at the national level (third prediction)
we use data on the di⁄erence between pre-tax and post tax income distributions, ob-
tained from the household income surveys included in the Luxemburg Income Study
(LIS). As a robustness check we also look at social welfare spending as a percentage of
GDP from OECD (2004), Social Expenditure database 1980-2001. More details on the
data used are given as we present the results and in the Data Appendix.
We limit the analysis to democracies, but use a relatively lax de￿nition of democracy,
looking only at what Freedom House (2003) de￿nes as ￿political rights￿ which is a
measure of the existence of free, open and fair elections that determine who actually rule.
We do not use the other component ￿￿civil liberties￿￿to ￿lter out non-democracies.
This allows some comparison of how the model fares in a wider range of countries. As
we discussed above, in developing economies the assumption that dN is independent of
income may be unreasonable as the poor also tend to live in more rural areas separated
from the rest of their nation by physical and linguistic barriers. Further, the assumption
that status is mainly a matter of economic achievements may be untenable in countries
where group status may still be predominantly hereditary. Finally, the ￿grand￿schemes
of redistribution we are considering here (as opposed to transfers to speci￿c groups)
change very slowly. Our model should thus account for these long-run equilibria in
established democracies ￿but not in transition economies.
We stress the national-identi￿cation side of the model and not the class-identi￿cation
side for two reasons. One is practical: in contrast with data on national identi￿cation,
data on class identi￿cation are harder to obtain. While many surveys (e.g. the GSS,
Eurobarometer, WVS) ask respondents what social class they belong to, this is at best a
self-categorization question,36 similar to asking ￿to which nation do you belong?￿It tells
us little about identi￿cation as we de￿ned it (more on this below). Second, the e⁄ect
of class identi￿cation seems somewhat less contentious. It would not be too surprising
to ￿nd that low income individuals with strong ￿working class￿identi￿cation desire
more redistribution then their comrades with weak class identi￿cation. The predictions
regarding national identi￿cation appear more in need of empirical veri￿cation.
36Indeed the question usually does not even give us a good measure of self-categorization since most
surveys do not allow the respondent the option of not belonging to any class.
25Before turning to the results we stress that unlike the evidence we presented for
the general model, the empirical analysis below is correlational in nature. By itself, it
cannot prove causality.
5.1 Preferences for redistribution by income and national iden-
ti￿cation
Our de￿nition of social identity requires that an agent care about the status of his
group. In experimental studies, such preferences can be directly inferred from behavior
(e.g. ingroup favoritism in allocation decisions that do not a⁄ect own payo⁄s). In larger
empirical studies, we have to rely on survey questions. Ellemers et al. (1999a) show
that ingroup favoritism in allocation decisions is captured by questions on ￿commitment
to the group￿ , i.e. the desire to continue acting as a group member. These consist of
agreement to such statements as ￿I would like to continue working with my group￿or
￿I dislike being a member of my group￿ . On the other hand, ingroup favoritism is not
captured by mere self-categorization statements such as ￿I am like other members of
my group.￿
The WVS contains a question asking: ￿How proud are you to be [e.g. French]?￿
answered on a scale of 1 to 4 (￿very proud￿ , ￿quite proud￿ , ￿not very proud￿and ￿not
at all proud￿ ). This question seems reasonably well suited to capture our concept of
national identity. As mentioned above, no such question exists with respect to class
identity.
The WVS also contains a question that captures our concept of support for redis-
tribution. It is worded as follows: ￿How would you place your views on this scale? 1
means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree com-
pletely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between,
you can choose any number in between.￿The statements are: ￿Incomes should be made
more equal￿on one extreme and ￿We need larger income di⁄erences as incentives for
individual e⁄ort￿on the other extreme. This captures preferences over the type of poli-
cies that we have assumed in the model, namely ones that make incomes more equal
(as opposed, for example, to policies designed to secure a minimal standard of living
for the poor37). The question also captures the trade-o⁄in terms of incentives for e⁄ort
37In fact, the WVS contains a question on whether "the government should take more responsibility
to ensure that everyone is provided for" or "people should take more responsibility to provide for
themselves" ￿without reference to equality or relative position. The relationship between national
26that underlies our speci￿cation of deadweight losses from taxation.
Descriptive statistics are in Table A3. Median support for redistribution ranges from
3 to 7, with standard deviations of around 2.9. Household income data are comparable
to data from LIS household surveys, but with lower means in most countries, suggesting
that the rich are not well represented. The fraction of the survey population who are
very proud to be members of their nation ranges from 19% in West Germany to 94%
in Venezuela.
As a way of directly looking at the data, Figure 3 presents nonparametric estimates
of the expected support for redistribution as a function of log household income. For
each World Values survey, we break down the population into two groups by level of
pride in one￿ s nation. For each survey we then estimate a separate regression function
for each of the two groups, using Fan (1992) locally weighted regressions. The ￿rst group
(shown by the solid lines) includes those professing to be ￿very proud￿to be members
of their nation. The other group (dashed lines) includes the rest. The analysis is
performed only for those surveys where actual household income categories could be
retrieved from the reported income categories. Also, we do not correct for household
size since no direct measure of it is available (see Data Appendix on both these issues
in the WVS). It is convenient to divide the economies into more and less advanced,
which we do using real GDP per capita.38
The ￿rst thing to note is that within each group, support for redistribution is gen-
erally decreasing in income in most surveys, with occasional nonmonotonicities at the
tails of the income distribution. More important for our purpose is the fact that in most
advanced economies, people who identify more strongly with their nation prefer a lower
level of redistribution than people with low levels of identi￿cation and similar income.
This pattern seems to hold in Austria, Britain, Canada, Finland, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and Germany (West and East). The only advanced
economies where this relationship is not apparent are Belgium, Italy and Spain.39 Out-
identity and support for these policies is indeed less clear than the relationship between national
identity and support for equalizing incomes.
38Economies are classi￿ed as ￿Less Advanced￿in a given year if Real GDP per capita (Heston et al.
2002) is less than 50% of USA Real GDP per capita.
39Note that (except for Switzerland) Italy, Spain and Belgium have the strongest ethnic-regional
cleavages among the western democracies (I am grateful to John Londregan for this point). This
suggests that our model may need to be adjusted when a strong regional identity is available. If the
predominant immediate social group is not the class but the region, then it is not clear that a shift to
a national identity will in general mean less support for redistribution. Northern Italy or Catalonia for
example are relatively rich regions and hence shifting from a national to a regional identity in these
areas may actually reduce support for redistribution. But ethnic and regional identities merit further
27side the industrial world, however, there is usually no clear di⁄erence between the two
groups in the support for redistribution, once we control for income (the exceptions
being Turkey 1990 and Latvia 1996).
Another way to look at these data is presented in Table 1. The table reports OLS
regressions of the support for redistribution on log income and dummies for level of
national pride, controlling for sex, age, years of education and log household size.40 We
refrain from pooling the data together, since the variables are not equivalent across sur-
veys. In particular, the attitude to redistribution is stated in reference to the local level
of income inequality (￿incomes should be made more equal￿ ), which di⁄ers between the
surveys. Hence, we report a separate regression for each survey. The results show once
again a strong negative relationship between income and preferences for redistribution
in almost all countries. Further, people who profess to be ￿very proud￿of being mem-
bers of their nation appear to support redistribution signi￿cantly less than people who
profess to be ￿not proud￿or ￿not at all proud￿ , controlling for log of income and years
of education. The point estimates are negative in 23 out of 27 available surveys ￿and
appear very large when compared to the e⁄ect of income. If taken literally, the point
estimates imply that moving from not being proud to being very proud in the nation
is equivalent in terms of attitudes towards redistribution, to having one￿ s household
income multiplied by a factor of between 1.5 and 3 in most western democracies. The
estimated e⁄ect is exceptionally large in the two surveys from the United States, but is
based on very few American respondents in the base category. Even moving just one
notch from ￿quite proud￿to ￿very proud￿is equivalent to multiplying household income
by a factor of 6.5 and 1.9 in the 1990 and 1995 American surveys, respectively. Consis-
tent with the non-parametric estimations, the relationship between national pride and
preferences for redistribution is statistically signi￿cant in most industrialized countries,
but weaker in the less advanced countries.
To make sure that the national pride dummies (which, as we shall see in the next
section are strongly correlated with income) are not picking up some non-linear e⁄ect
investigation that is beyond the scope of this paper.
40The results are very similar without controlling for these additional variables. We report OLS
rather than ten-categories ordered probits mainly for ease of interpretation. The qualitative results
are una⁄ected by the choice of estimation method. However, an argument could perhaps be made that
a cardinal interpretation of the variable is not entirely misleading since the support for redistribution
is elicited by showing respondents a scale with equally spaced numbers running from 1 to 10, where
the two extremes are associated with speci￿c and opposite views on the question. There is thus no
a priori reason to think that the distance between 2 and 3 should be perceived as di⁄erent from the
distance between 5 and 6.
28of income, we repeated the estimations with non-linear terms for income up to a third
order polynomial. The estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors for the ￿very proud￿
and ￿quite proud￿dummies were hardly a⁄ected. Finally, the third column of Table
1 shows that, as expected, the e⁄ect of being ￿quite proud￿is generally smaller than
that of being ￿very proud￿ ￿although it retains a negative sign in almost all surveys.
5.2 National identi￿cation by income
Available data seem to support the prediction that national identi￿cation is negatively
related to support for redistribution ￿at least in advanced economies. But who are the
nationalists? The model predicts that low income individuals, having less to be proud
of in their immediate social group, will in general tend to identify more strongly with
the nation. To test this prediction, we use detailed micro data from the ISSP 1995
National Identity module. The ISSP 1995 includes surveys from 22 democracies (using
our broad de￿nition of democracy based on political rights). The surveys include the
following six items which seem to capture our notion of national identity:
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [1. Agree
strongly; 2. Agree; 3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Disagree 5. Disagree
strongly]
1. I would rather be a citizen of (R￿ s country) than of any other country
in the world.
2. There are some things about (R￿ s country) today that make me feel
ashamed of (R￿ s country).
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were
more like the people in (R￿ s country).
4. Generally (R￿ s country) is a better country than most other countries.
5. When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud
to be citizen of (R￿ s country).
6. (R￿ s country) should follow its own interests, even if this leads to con-
￿ icts with other nations.
While all items gauge feelings of national pride, items 2 and 5 are conditional on
transitory conditions (￿things about my country today￿ ), and may thus be less suit-
able to capture ￿commitment to the group￿ . The ISSP surveys also include data on
household income, education and demographics. Descriptive statistics are in Table A4.
29For each country and each of the six national pride items, we estimated an ordered
probit model with the national identity variable as the dependent variable and with log
of income, log of household size, sex and age as independent variables. We then repeated
this procedure with controls for years of schooling. The results (not shown) were as
follows. For items 3, 4 and 6, the estimated coe¢ cient on log income is negative in all the
surveys: the higher the income, the lower is the extent of national identi￿cation. This
e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant in between 17 to 19 of the 22 surveys. This pattern
generally holds also when controlling for years of education. Further, since in most
democracies the more educated groups also enjoy a higher status, the logic of our
theoretical model would lead us to suspect that more highly educated individuals would
identify less with their nation (though of course there may also be other reasons for this
relationship). This expectation is generally con￿rmed, although the relationship is less
robust than that of income. For item 1 the estimated coe¢ cient on income is generally
negative but is statistically signi￿cant in only 13 of the 22 surveys. Finally, items 2
(shame) and 5 (sports) indeed show a weaker relationship to income. Item 5 gets the
￿right￿sign in almost all countries, but the e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant in only 7
of them. Item 2 has the correct sign in only about half the surveys, and is statistically
signi￿cant in only 4 surveys (all the signi￿cant coe¢ cients have the right sign, though:
richer people feel more ashamed of their country).
We do not report all these coe¢ cients (from more than 250 regressions). As a way
of summarizing the data, we do the following. First, we construct a national identity
scale from these six items. Answers to each item are scored from 0 to 4, with a higher
score representing the more nationalist answer, and the items are then summed up with
equal weights. The resulting scale (￿=0.61) takes values in {0,1, 2,...,24}. Second, we
estimate by OLS a linear regression model using this scale as the dependant variable
and log income as explanatory variable, controlling for log household size, sex and
age. These regressions cannot of course be interpreted in the standard sense, since
the constructed scale is hardly a cardinal variable. But as we are only interested in
the sign of the relationship, these shortcuts are a useful way to summarize the data.
The results are presented in Table 2. The data seem overwhelmingly supportive of
the notion that poorer people tend to identify more strongly with their nation. A
negative relationship between income and the national identi￿cation scale is apparent
in all countries surveyed. The relationship generally holds also when controlling for
years of education. The results are even stronger when using a four-item scale that
does not include items 2 and 5 to measure national identi￿cation.
30Again, by itself this result cannot prove the chain of causality proposed by the
model. But it ￿ts in well with the proposed model and with the experimental results
from social psychology.
5.3 The cross country patterns
Finally, we come to the overall levels of redistribution and national identi￿cation. Ac-
cording to the model in equilibrium we should expect high levels of redistribution to be
accompanied with relatively low levels of national identi￿cation and vice versa. Since
according to the model both these variables are endogenous, we only look at correlations
here.
To measure the extent of redistribution as de￿ned by our model we need data on
both pre-tax and after-tax income. The only available data that are also reasonably
comparable across countries are the data from the Luxemburg Income Study compiled
by Milanovic (2000). For each country participating in the LIS, these data include the
distribution of household per-capita factor income and the distribution of household
per-capita disposable income. Factor income is de￿ned as pre-transfer and pre-tax
income, and includes wages, income from self-employment, income from ownership of
physical and ￿nancial capital, and gifts. Disposable income is equal to factor income
plus all government cash transfers minus direct personal taxes and mandatory employee
contributions. As a measure of the extent of redistribution, we use the ￿share gain￿of
the bottom quintile, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the share of the bottom quintile
in factor and disposable income. For example, if the bottom quintile receives 1% of
total factor income, while the same people receive 10% of total disposable income, the
share gain is 9 percentage points. We match these data with measures of national
identi￿cation from the ISSP 1995 and the WVS, using the closest available LIS data
point to the date of the WVS or ISSP surveys (see Data Appendix). Note that since we
no longer require individual income data, we can now use the entire set of democracies
covered by the WVS between 1981 and 1998.
Figure 4 presents the association between redistribution levels and national
identi￿cation using the ISSP 1995. The horizontal axis measures the median of the
six-item national identity scale described in the previous section. On the vertical axis
we have the share gain of the bottom quintile. Panel (a) presents all democracies
participating in the ISSP on which we also have data on the share gain. Panel (b)
excludes the transition economies of Eastern Europe, that one would suspect had not
31yet reached equilibrium by the time of these surveys. In both panels, a clear negative
relationship appears. The relationship is particularly clean when we focus only on
the long established western democracies, with Germany exhibiting very low national
pride and very high levels of redistribution, and the USA among the proudest and least
redistributive countries. To get a sense of the strength of the association, the R2 from
regressing the share-gain on national identi￿cation alone is 0.49 in the entire sample,
and 0.72 in the sample without the transition economies.
Figure 5 repeats this exercise with the larger set of surveys available from the WVS.
On the horizontal axis we now have the estimated fraction of the population in each
country professing the highest level of national pride. The pattern is again extraordi-
narily clear, especially when we exclude the eastern European countries. The R2 is 0.61
when we exclude eastern Europe and 0.46 for the entire sample. Note that this pat-
tern holds in spite of the commonly held view that the welfare state makes Europeans
proud of their country: the more redistributive countries are actually characterized by
less national pride.41
Most of the negative relationship comes from cross country variation and not vari-
ation within countries over time. Movements within countries ￿in both dimensions ￿
are very small relative to the di⁄erences between countries. This suggests rather stable
equilibria. To see this more clearly, Figure 6 presents the same data as in Figure 5(b)
separately for each country on which we have more than one observation, maintaining
the same scale for all countries. It may still be interesting to note that most of the
movements are in accordance with our model. In particular consider the movements
that seem to have occurred between the early 80￿ s and the mid 90￿ s in the Netherlands,
Denmark, Sweden and Norway. In all these countries, we observe an apparent shift to
lower levels of redistribution, coupled with higher levels of national identi￿cation. The
reverse seems to have happened in Canada and Spain (and perhaps also in France and
Germany) where levels of redistribution increased and levels of national identi￿cation
decreased during the 1990￿ s. Why these changes might have happened is a matter
for further research. Indeed some of these ￿changes￿may well be measurement noise.
What we do want to emphasize then is the cross country pattern.
As a ￿nal robustness check, Figure 7 looks at an indirect measure of redistribution,
namely social welfare expenditure as percentage of GDP (OECD 2004). While this is
41Recall that the survey questions used are not using the word ￿nation￿which may invoke various
connotations, but rather ask ￿How proud are you to be French?￿ (WVS) or whether a respondent
￿would rather be a citizen of Germany than of any other country in the world￿(ISSP).
32an imperfect measure, a clear negative relationship is still apparent using both our mea-
sures of national identi￿cation. The data in panel (b) suggest that regional or cultural
factors may also be at work, shifting both redistribution and national identi￿cation
down in Japan and Korea. Interestingly, the large di⁄erence in social spending between
these two countries corresponds to a di⁄erence in levels of national identi￿cation ￿much
like the pattern across western democracies. Finally, it is noteworthy that contrary to
social welfare expenditure, military expenditure as a share of GDP is not negatively
related to measures of national identi￿cation (in fact the correlation is weakly positive
using the WVS data).
It is of course possible that the cross country correlation is driven by some other
factors (or ￿xed e⁄ects) that a⁄ect both national identi￿cation and levels of redistrib-
ution, without the direct link between the two postulated by our model. However, the
micro level results presented above limit the relevance of this possibility. As we have
seen, the relationship between national identi￿cation and redistribution also holds at
the individual level: within almost every western democracy, people who identify with
their nation support less redistribution than people who do not. And in almost every
country, poverty seems to encourage nationalism. If the grand, long-run redistribu-
tive system re￿ ects voters￿preferences, then it would indeed be puzzling had the cross
country patterns not re￿ ected the micro results. Overall then, for advanced and well
established democracies, the data lend strong support to the model.
6 Conclusion
Processes of social identi￿cation and their interactions with economic and political fac-
tors often seem hopelessly complex, and beyond the scope of economic theory. This
paper has tried to show, however, that robust regularities observed by social psycholo-
gists and experimental economists can help render such processes amenable to standard
economic analysis. As we have seen, the results obtained from such an analysis may in
turn help tie together such previously disjointed phenomena as national identi￿cation,
economic inequality and political preferences.
Experimental evidence strongly supports the basic assumptions of our general model.
People identify more strongly with high status groups than with low status groups.
They also identify more strongly with a group the more similar they are to that group.
In turn, a person who identi￿es with a group behaves in a way that balances his own
33material payo⁄with the ￿good￿of that group ￿measured in comparison to other groups.
Our application to redistribution focused on the endogeneity of group status. For a
given level of pre-tax inequality, a high tax rate decreases the di⁄erence in standards of
living between the poor and the rich, and hence makes identi￿cation with a relatively
poor social stratum more likely. Conversely, at a low tax rate the low status of the
poor social strata may cause a shift in identi￿cation from the immediate social class
to the more abstract nation. Now, since policies a⁄ect group status, political prefer-
ences may re￿ ect identity concerns and not just material payo⁄s: identifying with the
poor class increases support for redistribution while identifying with the nation shifts
identity concerns to other issues. This creates a negative relationship between levels of
redistribution and levels of national identi￿cation. The analysis further indicates the
likely e⁄ects of national threats and ingroup heterogeneity on redistributive policies. It
also points to the fact that increased income inequality need not lead to more demand
for redistribution, as it can shift the poor from class identi￿cation to a national one.
Data from a large set of advanced democracies suggests that, for given income
levels, national identi￿cation reduces support for income equalization. At the same
time, low income is related to national identi￿cation, even when controlling for years
of schooling. These individual level e⁄ects are in turn consistent with a remarkable
cross country relationship between income redistribution and national identi￿cation ￿a
relationship driven not just by the cross-Atlantic divide, but also by di⁄erences within
Europe.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1:
Part (i): By (15) and (16) we know t￿
P(ym) > t￿
N(ym):The condition in part (i) of the
proposition then implies
￿
￿
(dN ￿ dP) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿t
￿
P(ym) ￿ 1) < ￿ ￿ ￿(￿t
￿
N(ym) ￿ 1): (21)
But this implies
￿
￿
(dN￿dP) < (RN￿RP)jt￿=t￿
N(ym)
So t￿
N(ym) satis￿es (19) and (20) and is an equilibrium tax rate. The ￿rst inequality in
(21) implies
￿
￿
(dN ￿ dP) ￿ (RN ￿ RP)jt￿=t￿
P(ym)
so by (19) t￿
P(ym) cannot be an equilibrium tax rate. This makes t￿
N(ym) the unique
equilibrium tax rate. By (13) gm = N:
A similar proof holds for part (ii).
For part (iii) note that the ￿rst inequality ensures that t￿
P(ym) satis￿es both (19) and (20)
so it is an equilibrium tax rate. The second inequality does the same for t￿
N(ym):
B Data
B.1 WVS Household Income Data:
All WVS Data are from the ￿rst three waves of the WVS (Inglehart et al. 2000).
The World values survey reports a measure of total, pre-tax household income ￿counting all
wages, slalries, pensions and other incomes that come in... before taxes and other deductions￿
For most countries, household income is reported in ten categories, usually running from 1 to
10, where the lowest and uppermost categories are open ended.42. The data used for individual
42The USA in the second wave has several open categories at the top. This does not alter
the form of the likelihood function.
38level analysis in this paper are only from those countries where the income categories cuto⁄
points is known. Contrary to the impression one might get from the WVS literature, these
income categories are not deciles. A minor problem arises, therefore, of assigning individuals
a level of income based on the reported categories, that is, of assigning a speci￿c point within
the reported interval. This is done here by assuming a log-normal distribution of household
income within each nation and wave, and estimating the parameters of the distribution by
maximum likelihood. Once one has the distribution, each individual is assigned the median
point conditional on the interval within which her income lies. All calculations were performed
using the sampling weights in the di⁄erent nations and waves.
B.2 WVS Household Size Data
Information related to household size in the world values surveys is indirectly available from
the following questions:
￿ Have you had any children? IF YES, how many?
￿ How many of them are still living at home? [ asked in second wave only]
￿ Do you live with your parents?
￿ Are you currently....(1) Married; (2) Living as married; (3) Divorced; (4) Separated;
(5) Widowed; (6) Single
Since in the second wave we have data on number of children still living at home, we can
reasonably impute household size for most respondents. However, there is no clear way to
predict household size for young respondents living with their parents. For the third wave
we do the following. First we estimate for each country participating in the second wave
household-size equations, using as regressors the above mentioned questions that appear in
both waves, as well as sex, income and religion (the ￿t was good in all regressions: R2 around
0.7). We then use the obtained coe¢ cients to predict household size for wave 3. For countries
that did not participate in the second wave we use coe¢ cients from neighboring countries with
similar distribution of number of children. Once again, household size cannot be predicted
for young respondents living with parents. Missing values for household size are ￿dummied
out￿in the regressions.
B.3 De￿nition of Democracy
We limit the analysis to countries whose Freedom House (2003) score for Political Rights is
either 1 or 2. These are characterized as follows:
Rating of 1￿ Countries and territories that receive a rating of 1 for political rights come
closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections.
Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, and the
opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Minority groups have reasonable
self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus.
Rating of 2￿ Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those
rated 1. Such factors as political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minori-
ties, and foreign or military in￿ uence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of
freedom.
39B.4   Matching LIS Household Income Surveys in the 
Milanovic (2000) data with WVS and ISSP data 
 
Table A1: WVS and LIS 
WVS LIS survey WVS LIS survey
Australia 81  1981  Italy 81  1986 
Australia 95  1994  Italy 90  1991 
Belgium 81  1985  Netherlands 81  1983 
Belgium 90  1988  Netherlands 90  1991 
Britain 81  1979  Norway 81  1979 
Britain 90  1991  Norway 90  1991 
Britain 98  1995  Norway 96  1995 
Canada 81  1981  Poland 96  1995 
Canada 90  1991  Slovakia 90  1992 
Czech 90  1992  Spain 81  1980 
Denmark 81  1987  Spain 90  1990 
Denmark 90  1992  Sweden 81  1981 
East Germany 97
* 1994 Sweden  90  1992 
Finland 90  1991  Sweden 96  1995 
Finland 96  1995  USA 81  1979 
France 81
** 1979 USA  90  1991 
France 90  1989  USA 95  1994 
Hungary 90  1991  West Germany 81  1981 
Ireland 90  1987  West Germany 90  1989 
    West Germany 97
* 1994 
* The WVS maintained the separation of East and West Germany in the 1997 survey. Both are matched to 
the same 1994 LIS household survey, taken in the unified Germany.  
** We use the 1979 LIS rather than the 1981, since the 1981 data yield a gross outlier compared to other 
France household surveys. The share gain of the bottom quintile is 12.6, 13.7 and 15 in 1979, 1984 and 
1989, respectively; but it is only 4.5 in the 1981 survey (see Milanovic 2000, Appendix B). 
 
Table A2: ISSP 1995 and LIS
ISSP 1995 LIS survey
Australia   1994 
 Canada   1994 
 Czech-Rep.  1992 
 Germany*  1994 
 Great-Britain   1995 
 Hungary   1991 
 Ireland   1987 
 Italy   1995 
 Netherlands   1994 
 Norway   1995 
 Poland   1995 
 Russia   1995 
 Slovak-Rep.   1992 
 Spain   1990 
 Sweden   1995 
 United-States   1994 
* The ISSP 1995 included separate surveys for East and West Germany. Both are matched to the same 
1994 LIS household survey, taken in the unified Germany.  B.5  Means, Medians and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Estimations 
 
Table A3: WVS Micro Data 
 
   Support  for  Redistribution Household  Income National  Pride Age 
Survey and 
year N           Median  Mean  SD Mean SD
Fraction 
Very Proud 
Fraction 
Quite Proud 
Fraction 
Male 
Mean SD
                      
Austria  90                       1324 6 5.56 3.03 254820 125122.70 0.53 0.40 0.39 46.83 17.00
Belgium  90                       1517 4 5.09 2.94 767466 362234.00 0.31 0.50 0.51 45.27 16.78
Brazil  90                       1622 5 5.18 3.29 1359695 1883210.00 0.64 0.23 0.51 36.26 12.57
Britain  90                     1046 4 4.45 2.44 12961 8336.52 0.52 0.37 0.50 46.60 18.02
Bulgaria  98                        785 5 5.55 2.78 2956961 3033386.00 0.51 0.35 0.49 47.66 17.82
Canada  90                     1423 3 4.23 2.86 40922 21782.22 0.60 0.34 0.51 42.73 16.06
Chile  90  1445                     5 5.01 3.19 820766 724468.70 0.53 0.34 0.48 38.53 15.69
E Germany 90  1181  3  3.38  2.60  21142  8157.68 0.29          0.45 0.47 44.68 16.72
Estonia  96 762                      6 5.66 2.49 29521 15251.64 0.22 0.46 0.43 43.25 15.48
Finland  90                        549 4 4.38 2.77 157302 62467.65 0.38 0.45 0.52 41.08 13.85
Hungary  90                        918 5 5.21 2.96 228673 137771.60 0.47 0.41 0.49 45.60 16.61
India  90  2279                     5 5.03 2.97 29198 17905.73 0.76 0.19 0.56 35.23 13.21
Italy  90                     1363 5 5.12 2.89 28200000 22300000.00 0.40 0.48 0.51 42.15 15.83
Japan  90                        724 5 5.30 2.26 6151936 2704937.00 0.29 0.38 0.51 42.76 13.94
Japan  95                        770 5 5.49 2.17 6830066 3071068.00 0.26 0.38 0.52 45.96 14.68
Latvia  96                    879 4 4.62 2.39 1903  1129.55 0.23 0.45 0.43 42.14 16.17
Netherlands  90  752                      4 4.81 2.04 48962 23881.90 0.22 0.53 0.48 42.94 15.90
Portugal  90  1089                     7 6.66 2.81 1110523 737980.70 0.42 0.49 0.49 41.97 17.47
Spain  90  3180                     6 6.02 2.71 1427371 802874.10 0.45 0.42 0.48 42.49 17.16
Spain  96                        843 6 5.50 2.81 1724178 1508714.00 0.68 0.25 0.50 45.29 17.78
Sweden  96                        867 5 5.13 2.15 277828 125906.40 0.47 0.43 0.51 44.28 16.04
Switzerland  96  889                      6 6.25 3.03 52043 25724.76 0.28 0.50 0.50 45.91 17.23
Turkey  90  971                    7 6.42 3.23 12600000 17400000.00 0.67 0.25 0.50 36.30 14.07
USA  90                   1614 4 4.21 2.53 31883  16547.45 0.75 0.23 0.51 46.25 17.30
USA  95                       1320 6 5.52 2.71 38832 23916.44 0.80 0.18 0.50 47.99 17.70
Venezuela  96  1059                     6 5.47 3.31 846149 786467.00 0.94 0.05 0.50 36.17 13.94
W  Germany  90  1600                     4 4.77 2.75 49664 21806.48 0.19 0.49 0.50 45.92 17.63
Unweighted data. The Support for Redistribution variable takes values from {1,2,…,10}. Household income is annual in local currency (see Appendix B.1).  Table A4: ISSP 1995 Micro Data 
 
    National Identity Scale Household  Income 
Years of 
Schooling Age 
Nation        N Median  Mean  SD  Mean    SD Mean  SD
Fraction 
Male 
Mean SD
                     
Australia                1947  16 16.01  3.21  48195.94  42266.84 12.21 4.11 0.51 47.83 14.98
Austria                  698 17 16.52  4.12  23010.74  10151.84 11.55 9.82 0.47 46.19 16.90
Bulgaria                    634 16 15.81 3.84 8648.85 6735.85     0.51 48.45 16.58
Canada                1162  16 15.46  3.75  47504.30  24278.79 15.09 4.07 0.49 41.16 14.91
Czech-Republic                      596  13 12.81 3.40 12328.43 10941.97 16.32 16.56 0.54 43.91 15.78
E-Germany 433                    11 11.31 4.43  3093.30 1350.63 14.44 16.41 0.52 47.04 15.53
Great-Britain                      805 14 14.34 3.70 17575.16 12329.24 12.46 9.47  0.43 46.09 17.03
Hungary                  734 15 14.79  3.49  37776.65  27796.47 11.03 5.53 0.45 46.49 17.35
Ireland                  817 16 15.89  2.99  17413.05  10168.52 12.28 3.18 0.49 46.02 16.14
Italy                1017  12 11.98  3.85  2849.80  1347.80 11.22 4.50 0.50 42.47 15.44
Japan                782  15 14.53  3.61  7255.12  4029.56 14.54 13.40 0.50 46.42 15.02
Latvia                468  13 13.16  3.71  99.37 80.49  12.12 3.91 0.37 45.26 16.82
Netherlands                      1174 13 12.68 3.27  68522.57 34511.15 13.55 4.16 0.52 42.73 15.40
New-Zealand                        797 16 15.75 2.98 45974.28 23966.59 15.01 7.91 0.49 45.42 16.07
Norway 1083  15            14.47  3.41  318993.50 144173.20  23.39 27.55 0.52 42.17 16.49
Poland              1005  14 14.13  3.29  800.46  573.64  10.97 6.20 0.49 46.25 16.54
Russia                  834 14 13.79  3.52  4631.83  59850.01 11.60 5.47 0.47 45.18 15.53
Slovak-Republic                        1012 12 11.81 4.08 10742.22 8436.43 15.15 16.14 0.50 41.57 16.42
Slovenia 464                14 13.84  3.69  121855.60 90692.52 15.88 19.37 0.47 42.65 15.12
Spain                714  15 14.52  3.35  141838.20 92814.18 15.39 21.43 0.51 44.72 17.96
Sweden                  882 13 13.13  3.55  21162.13  9583.84 11.95 5.72 0.53 44.67 15.50
United-States                        1048 16 15.71 3.37 38080.25 24485.75 13.64 3.79 0.46 43.57 15.80
W-Germany                      901 11 11.27 4.66  3847.73 1622.77 14.96 18.06 0.57 46.47 15.70
Unweighted data. See text for definition of National Identity scale. It takes values from {0,1,2,…,24} Household income in local currency, definitions vary 
across surveys. Years of schooling measure number of years of full time schooling except in Great-Britain where it is recoded from age when completed full time 
education. Table 1: Support for Redistribution, Income and National Pride 
 
Survey and 
Year log  Income Very  Proud Quite  Proud N 
Austria 90  -0.903**  (0.172)  -0.638** (0.318) -0.301  (0.319) 1323 
Belgium  90  -1.152**  (0.182) -0.152  (0.217) -0.120  (0.188) 1517 
Brazil  90  -0.324**  (0.083) 0.128  (0.249) -0.062  (0.271) 1622 
Britain 90  -0.868**  (0.120)  -0.572** (0.285) -0.316  (0.285) 1046 
Bulgaria  98  -0.373**  (0.154) -0.297  (0.285) -0.239  (0.283) 767 
Canada  90  -0.646**  (0.140) -0.715** (0.332) -0.436  (0.339) 1422 
Chile  90  -0.503**  (0.118) -0.373  (0.261) -0.436  (0.271) 1441 
E  Germany  90  -0.548**  (0.249) -0.715** (0.212) -0.359** (0.181) 1181 
Estonia 96  -0.895**  (0.197)  0.229 (0.255)  0.225 (0.209)  762 
Finland 90  -0.835**  (0.284)  -0.722*  (0.371) -0.529  (0.362) 549 
Hungary  90  -1.204**  (0.181) 0.171  (0.282) 0.457*  (0.276) 918 
India 90  -0.395**  (0.113)  0.409 (0.261)  0.217 (0.285)  2279 
Italy 90  -0.771**  (0.136)  -0.255 (0.261)  -0.109 (0.245)  1363 
Japan  90  -0.951**  (0.186) -0.872** (0.217) -0.588** (0.191) 723 
Japan  95  -1.092**  (0.180) -0.381*  (0.213) -0.281*  (0.170) 770 
Latvia 96  -0.610**  (0.146)  -0.977** (0.236) -0.299  (0.182) 879 
Netherlands  90 -0.936**  (0.152) -0.454** (0.222) -0.447** (0.180) 752 
Portugal 90  -0.721**  (0.149)  -0.229 (0.306)  -0.120 (0.300)  1089 
Spain 90  -0.766**  (0.105)  -0.694** (0.151) -0.701** (0.146) 3180 
Spain 96  -0.244  (0.172)  -0.202  (0.392) 0.136  (0.412) 842 
Sweden  96  -0.691**  (0.167) -0.226  (0.250) -0.079  (0.249) 867 
Switzerland 96  -1.234**  (0.211)  -0.763** (0.294) -0.480*  (0.253) 887 
Turkey 90  -0.468**  (0.119)  -1.747** (0.341) -1.723** (0.366) 968 
USA  90  -0.240* (0.126) -2.063** (0.529) -1.611** (0.537) 1560 
USA  95  -0.358**  (0.123) -0.904*  (0.530) -0.672  (0.541) 1310 
Venezuela 96  -0.403**  (0.151)  -0.021 (0.788)  -0.761 (0.917)  1059 
W Germany 90  -1.091**  (0.185)  -1.253** (0.205) -0.740** (0.154) 1600 
WVS data. OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses. Each row is a separate regression. Dependent 
variable is support for redistribution, ranging from 1 (“We need larger income differences as 
incentives for individual effort”) to 10 (“Incomes should be made more equal”). Reported are the 
estimated coefficients on log household income, and two dummies for national pride: “very proud” 
and “quite proud”. Omitted categories are “not proud” and “not at all proud”. 
All regressions control for log of household size, sex, age, and age squared. All regressions except 
Turkey 1990 also control for years of education. Missing values for household size and years of 
education are dummied out. 
** Denotes significantly different from zero at the 5 % level.  
* Denotes significantly different from zero at the 10 % level. Table 2: National Identification, Income and Years of Schooling 
 
 (1)  (2) 
Nation  log Income  N  log Income  Years of Schooling  N 
Australia -0.169  (0.110)  1889  -0.037 (0.127)  -0.100**  (0.046) 1889 
Austria -0.520  (0.338)  698  -0.530 (0.338)  -0.018  (0.021) 698 
Bulgaria -0.538**  (0.189)  633 .  .  .  .  0 
Canada -0.228  (0.181)  1106  0.288  (0.200)  -0.195**  (0.031)  1081 
Czech Rep.  -1.033**  (0.296)  593  -1.005** (0.298)  -0.012  (0.011)  591 
E-Germany -0.870**  (0.443)  433  -0.991** (0.422)  -0.051**  (0.014)  417 
Great-Britain -0.793**  (0.181)  805  -0.823** (0.179)  -0.034**  (0.014)  805 
Hungary -1.084**  (0.271)  734 -1.020**  (0.277)  -0.044  (0.029)  734 
Ireland -0.530**  (0.178)  817  -0.471**  (0.191)  -0.030  (0.037)  813 
Italy -0.807**  (0.259)  1017  -0.120 (0.270)  -0.216**  (0.032) 1017 
Japan -0.776**  (0.237)  782  -0.777**  (0.238)  -0.009  (0.010)  778 
Latvia -0.346  (0.221)  468  -0.215  (0.235) -0.094**  (0.046)  467 
Netherlands -0.952**  (0.183)  1174  -0.677**  (0.185)  -0.153** (0.028) 1174 
New Zealand  -0.502**  (0.195)  787  -0.902** (0.269)  0.025  (0.024)  368 
Norway -0.647**  (0.199)  1083  -0.783** (0.211)  -0.019**  (0.005)  1010 
Poland -1.150**  (0.172)  1005  -1.081**  (0.176)  -0.038*  (0.022)  1005 
Slovak Rep.  -0.733**  (0.246)  1012  -0.735** (0.246)  0.001  (0.008)  1012 
Slovenia -0.826**  (0.301)  463 -0.780** (0.303)  -0.011  (0.008)  459 
Spain -0.910**  (0.222)  714  -0.901** (0.225)  0.009  (0.005)  700 
Sweden -0.999**  (0.245)  882 -0.689**  (0.261)  -0.110**  (0.039)  826 
United-States -0.516** (0.110)  1045  -0.355** (0.165)  -0.160*  (0.091)  1045 
W-Germany -1.097**  (0.337)  900  -0.894** (0.341)  -0.022**  (0.009)  875 
ISSP 1995 data. OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is national identification 
scale. Each row reports the coefficient on the log of household income from two separate regressions. The 
regressions in column (1) do not control for years of schooling, while those in column (2) do, with the 
estimated coefficient reported.  Samples do not include non-citizens.  All regressions control for sex, age 
and log of household size. Missing values for household-size are dummied out. 
** Denotes significantly different from zero at the 5 % level.  
* Denotes significantly different from zero at the 10 % level. Figure 1: Typical Choice Sets in Minimal Group Experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ( a )         ( b )  
 
 
The solid lines represent continuous versions of the commonly used “Tajfel Matrices” (Tajfel et 
al., 1971). Panel (a) presents a choice between “Maximum Joint Profits” and both “Maximum 
Difference” and “Maximum Ingroup Profits”. Panel (b) presents a choice between “Maximum 
Difference” and both “Maximum Ingroup Profits” and “Maximum Joint Profits”. 
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a. Advanced Economies 
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W Germany 90Figure 3 (continued): Support for Redistribution by National Identity and Income 
b. Less Advanced Economies 
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Very 
Proud 
 
 Less 
Proud 
1.  WVS data. Locally weighted regressions, Fan (1992), with quartic kernels.  
2.  Household income is in local currency, bandwidths vary accordingly from 0.3 in Britain and West 
Germany to 0.9 in Turkey. The top or bottom income category is dropped if it contains less than 
1% of the relevant sample. Thus the bottom category is dropped in USA 95 and the top category is 
dropped in Brazil 90, Hungary 90, India 90, Italy 90, Spain 96, Turkey 90, USA 90 and Venezuela 
96. The observed hump shape in Finland 90 and Sweden 96 is caused by the bottom category, 
containing 15 (2.3%) and 14 (2.6%) observations respectively. The hump shape in USA 95 is 
caused by the second category, with 71 observations.   
3.  Support for redistribution is on a 1 to 10 scale (see Appendix B.3). 
4.  Each survey population is divided according to whether respondents are “very proud” to be 
members of their nation (the highest possible level) or not. The solid line is the regression function 
of support for redistribution among the very proud. The dashed line is that regression for 
respondents with lower national pride. 
5.  Economies are divided into “Advanced” and “Less Advanced” according to whether real GDP per 
capita (PWT 6.1, Heston et al. 2002) is less than 50% of USA real GDP per capita.   Figure 4: Redistribution and National Identity: ISSP data 
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b. Without Eastern Europe
 
National identity scale from ISSP 1995 (see main text for details). Share gain from LIS 
(Milanovic 2000).  Data are taken from the LIS household income surveys closest to 
1995 (see Data Appendix). Germany is represented as a single point since the median 
national identity score is identical in both East and West Germany.   
 Figure 5: Redistribution and National Identity: WVS data 
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b. Without Eastern Europe
 
Fraction very proud from WVS waves 1-3. Share gain from LIS (Milanovic 2000).  Data are 
taken from the LIS household income surveys closest to the WVS survey (see Data Appendix). Figure 6: Redistribution and National Identity Within countries Over Time 
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Graphs by cname2
 
Fraction very proud from WVS waves 1-3. Share gain from LIS (Milanovic 2000).  Data are 
taken from the LIS household income surveys closest to the WVS survey (see Data Appendix). 
Germany WVS data are from West Germany.  Figure 7: Social Expenditure and National Identity 
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b. WVS
 
Social Welfare spending is total social expenditure as percentage of GDP, from OECD (2004), Social 
Expenditure database (SOCX), 1980-2001. National identity scale is from ISSP 1995 (see main text for 
details). Fraction very proud is from WVS waves 1-3. Figures exclude Eastern Europe. 